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NOTES
meet the Board's monetary standards; but the plaintiff fails to
present his case to the NLRB, the Board's General Counsel re-
fuses to'issue a complaint, or the Board finds no violation of the
Labor Management Relations Act. In such cases it would appear
that existing preemption principles will remain valid; and con-
sequently, state court or state agency action will be precluded.
Charles R. Lindsay
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE- INTERVENTION BY INSURED IN
ACTIONS BROUGHT UNDER THE DIRECT ACTION STATUTE
Following a two-car collision, plaintiff, driver of one car,
brought a direct action for damages against the other driver's
insurer. The insured intervened, claiming damages against the
plaintiff on the ground that the plaintiff's negligence was the
cause of the collision. Plaintiff's objection to the intervention
was overruled by the trial court. On appeal, the Orleans Court
of Appeal held that the intervention should have been dismissed.'
On certiorari to the Louisiana Supreme Court, he/d, reversed.
In, a suit against an insurer under the Direct Action Statute,2
the insured is an interested party and can intervene to assist in
proving plaintiff's fault and to recover damages from the plain-
tiff for injuries sustained in the collision. Emmco Insurance
Company v. Globe Indemnity Company, 236 La. 286, 111 So.2d
115 (1959).
Article 390 of the Louisiana Code of Practice provides that
a prospective intervener must have "an interest in the success
of'either of the parties to the suit, or an interest opposed to
both."3 The term "interest" has not been clearly defined by the
jurisprudence. 4 It has been suggested, however, that it must be
1. Emmeo Ins. Co. v. Globe Indemnity Co., 105 So.2d 748, 752 (La. App.
1958) : "The so-called intervention in the instant suit being an independent claim
asserted by intervenor against one of the plaintiffs, it seems to us it does not
meet the test of law that the intervention must be one that must fall in the event
of the dismissal of plaintiff's suit. This intervention, if such were authorized by
law, could only have been dismissed in the event the plaintiffs were successful
in their suit against the defendant !"
2. LA. R.S. 22:655 (1950).
3. LA. CODE OF PRACTICE art. 390 (1870), now LA. R.S. 13:390 (1950).
4. See Blodgett Construction Co. v. Board of Commissioners, Caddo Levee
District, 153 La. 623, 96 So. 281 (1922) (contractor was allowed to intervene in
suit by subcontractor against levee board to recover balance due on work done) ;
Fortner's Heirs v. Pine Good Lumber Co., 146 La. 11, 83 So. 319 (1919) (person
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more than the "real and actual interest" required for a separate
action. 5 Having shown the required interest, the intervener
must take the suit as he finds it 6 and must not cause an undue
delay in the original proceedings.7 Further, since the interven-
tion is considered theoretically to rest upon the main demand, it
has been held that it must fall when the main demand is dis-
missed or discontinued." The latter rule has been criticized on
various grounds. The theoretical basis for this result in inter-
in possession of land cannot intervene in an action to establish title between two
other parties) ; Howell v. Mundy, 145 La. 291, 82 So. 274 (1919) (intervenor was
allowed to intervene in a suit against his attorney) ; Rives v. Gulf Refining Co.,
133 La. 178, 62 So. 623 (1913) (persons claiming a real right to land leased to
the defendant in an action may intervene) ; Besson v. Mayor of Donaldsonville,
49 La. Ann. 273, 21 So. 262 (1897) (intervenor allowed to intervene, and set up
title in themselves, in an action of slander of title by the plaintiff) ; Lincoln v.
New Orleans Express Co., 45 La. Ann. 729, 12 So. 937 (1893) (ordinary creditor
cannot intervene in an action by another ordinary creditor) ; H. B. Claflin Co. v.
B. Feibelman and Co., 44 La. Ann. 518, 10 So. 862 (1892) (creditor allowed to
intervene alleging a prior attachment on property); Jemison v. Barrow, 24 La.
Ann. 171 (1872) (vendee of land not allowed to intervene in action between two
mortgagees of the land); O'Brien v. Police Jury of Concordia, 2 La. Ann. 355
(1847) (plaintiff sued for contract price for building a levee, material furnisher
not allowed to intervene as he was not a party to the contract).
5. LA. CODE OF PRACTICE art. 15 (1870), now LA. R.S. 13:15 (1950). Pro-
posed Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure art. 1091, comment (a).
6. General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Jordan, 65 So.2d 627 (La. App. 1953)
Bonnabel v. Police Jury, 216 La. 798, 44 So.2d 872 (1950) ; Parish v. Holland,
166 La. 24, 116 So. 580 (1928) ; Cahn v. Ford, 42 La. Ann. 965, 8 So. 477 (1890).
These rules are codified in the Proposed Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure, art.
1094: "An intervener cannot object to the form of the action, to the venue, or to
any defects and informalities personal to the original parties." See also Fortner's
Heirs v. Pine Good Lumber Co., 146 La. 11, 83 So. 319 (1919) (person in pos-
session of land was not allowed to intervene in an action to establish title as it
would have changed the form of the action).
7. Urania Lumber Co. v. Louisiana Tax Commissioner, 171 La. 973, 132 So.
650 (1931) ; Seib v. Cooper, 170 La. 105, 127 So. 380 (1930) (intervention could
not be disposed of in advance as this would retard the principal suit) ; Jones v.
Lawrence, 4 La. Ann. 279 (1849) (intervenor was held to have abandoned his
action and court stated that when the principal demand had been tried no further
proceedings could be had).
8. Holley v. Butler Furniture Co., 217 La. 8, 45 So.2d 747 (1950) (plaintiff
had no right of action; therefore the intervention fell with the main demand);
Miller v. Board of Commissioners of Port of New Orleans, 199 La. 1071, 7 So.2d
355 (1942) (the right to sue the Board of Commissioners had not been given;
therefore plaintiff's action was dismissed and the intervention fell) ; Hodges v.
General Motors Acceptance Corp., 141 So. 783 (1932) (reaffirmed the rule that
the right to bring a separate suit is reserved to the intervener though he is dis-
missed when the plaintiff's action falls) ; St. Bernard Trappers' Ass'n v. Michel,
162 La. 366, 110 So. 617 (1926) (plaintiff made the motion that the suit be dis-
missed; on granting the motion, the court held the intervention fell with the main
demand) ; Erskine v. Gardiner, 162 La. 83, 110 So. 97 (1926) (even though the
plaintiff was dismissed as an imposter the intervention fell with the main de-
mand) ; J. Meyers and Co. v. Birotte, 41 La. Ann. 745, 6 So. 607 (1889) (plain-
tiff's motion to dismiss was granted and court held that there was no difference
between dismissal caused by defendant and one caused by plaintiff) ; Walmsley,
Carver & Co. v. Whitfield, 24 La. Ann. 258 (1872) (plaintiff's suit dismissed on
motion by the defendant and intervention fell) ; Todd v. Shouse, 14 La. Ann. 426
(1859) (suit dismissed when attachment on which suit rested was dissolved;
intervention fell).
vention could apply also to third opposition and reconventional
demand. Yet, the third opposition and reconventional demand
do not fall when the main demand is dismissed or discontinued.9
Further, when this rule is applied, the intervener has no chance
of obtaining relief unless he joins the plaintiff in asserting a
right against the defendant. When the intervener joins the de-
fendant asserting a claim against the plaintiff or asserts a claim
against both parties and is successful in getting the plaintiff's
demand dismissed, his intervention falls. 10 Also, the intervention
will fall in the event the plaintiff discontinues his suit." The
rule that the intervention falls with the main demand has been
defended on the ground that the intervener retains his right to
institute a separate action, but this is a hollow remedy since in
most cases the intervener is prejudiced by the additional delay.
The instant case presented the court with a new setting in
which to apply the above rules pertaining to intervention. Prior
to the enactment of the Direct Action Statute1 2 the insured was
a necessary party in an action against his insurer, 3 and could
reconvene for damages. However, this statute allows an action
to be brought directly against the insurer without naming the
insured as a party defendant. Thus, if the insured wishes to par-
ticipate in a suit between his insurer and another party, his only
remedy is the intervention which the insured sought to use in the
instant case. The trial court found for the intervener on the
merits, which resulted in the dismissal of the plaintiff's claim.
Thus, the possibility of applying the rule that intervention must
fall when the plaintiff's suit is dismissed was presented. How-
ever, the court refused to dismiss the intervener, 4 distinguish-
ing the earlier cases on the basis that they did not deal with a
"real party at interest (as contradistinguished from a stranger
9. Atkins v. Smith, 204 La. 468, 15 So.2d 855 (1943) (held that a third op-
position does not fall with a dismissal of the main demand). The rule under the
present law is the same in reconventional demands. Senseley v. First National
Life Ins. Co., 205 La. 61, 16 So.2d 906 (1944) ; Rives v. Stareke, 195 La. 378,
196 So. 657 (1940); Stringfellow v. Nowlin Bros., 157 La. 683, 102 So. 869
(1925).
10. MCMAHON, LOUISIANA PRACTICE 114, n. 58.2 (Supp. 1956).
11. St. Bernard Trappers' Ass'n v. Michel, 162 La. 366, 110 So. 617 (1926)
J. Meyers and Co. v. Birotte, 41 La. Ann. 745, 6 So. 607 (1889) ; LA. CODE OF
PRACTICE art. 491 (1870), now LA. R.S. 13:491 (1950).
12. LA. R.S. 22 :655 (1950).
13. Edwards v. Fidelity and Casualty Co., 11 La. App. 176, 123 So. 162
(1929).
14. The Supreme Court stated that the result was "in keeping with our mod-
ern jurisprudence and recent legislative enactments which generally sanction pro-
cedural results tending to avoid a multiplicity of suits." 237 La. 286, 291, 111
So.2d 115, 117 (1958).
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to a suit)."15 This language might be questionable since the Code
of Practice requires that all interveners have an interest in the
controversy, 16 and if an interest had not been shown in those
earlier cases the interventions would have fallen for that reason
alone. Justification for the decision is found, however, in the
fact that the insured had an interest in joining the defendant
in resisting the plaintiff's demand. Thus the decision appears to
fall within the letter and spirit of Article 390 of the Code of
Practice. It would seem, however, that the court limited the
holding of the instant case to actions brought under the Direct
Action Statute,'1 7 and the old rule will continue to be applied in
the other intervention cases not involving a use of the statute.
It is perhaps unfortunate that the court failed to take advantage
of this opportunity to overturn the rule requiring that the inter-
vention fall upon the dismissal of the plaintiff's demand.
In the proposed Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure the ques-
tion of who may intervene will be covered in Article 1091.18 The
principal change recommended is that the right sought to be
enforced will have to be "related to or connected with the object
of the pending action."'19 Furthermore the Louisiana State Law
Institute has recommended that the federal rule, allowing the
intervention to stand after the main demand has been dismissed,
be adopted in Louisiana.2 0 The other federal rules on the sub-
ject 1 were thought not to be acceptable to Louisiana practice.
15. 237 La. 286, 291, 111 So.2d 115, 117 (1958).
16. LA. CODE OF PRACTICE art. 390 (1870), now LA. R.S. 13:390 (1950).
17. 237 La. 286, 291, 111 So.2d 115, 117 (1958) : "rT]he procedure receiving
our approval herein is peculiarly applicable to those suits brought under the direct
action statute where the intervener is a real party at interest. Incidentally, in
effect it is the same procedure as that employed and recognized prior to the enact-
ment of such statute."
18. "A third person having an interest therein may intervene in a pending
action to enforce a right related to or connected with the object of the pending
action against one or more of the parties thereto by:
"(1) Joining with the plaintiff in demanding the same or similar relief against
the defendant;
"(2) Uniting with defendant in resisting the plaintiff's demand; or
"(3) Opposing both plaintiff and defendant."
19. Proposed Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure art. 1091. This requirement
of connexity, taken from the Italian Code of Procedure, is both broader and more
flexible than the test of a "common question of law or fact" of the federal practice.
20. Federal Rule 41 (a) ; Proposed Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure art. 1039.
21. Intervention in the Federal Rules is divided into two groups, intervention
of right and permissive intervention. 4 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE, Rule 24, at 1
(2d ed. 1950). Besides the general provisions for' intervention of right and per-
missive intervention there are also statutes granting each of these in specific
instances. Id. paragraph 24.06 at 25 and paragraph 24.10 at 64. Professor Moore
distinguishes the absolute and discretionary rights of intervention by stating:
"The main practical difference between absolute and discretionary rights of inter-
vention is that only in the absolute type will an appeal lie from the order refusing
[Vol. XX
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Another change in the present law will be a broadening of inter-
vention to include Louisiana's present third opposition.22 Under
the proposed Code of Civil Procedure an intervener may join
with the plaintiff "in demanding the same or similar relief
against the defendant," unite with the defendant "in resisting
the plaintiff's demand," or oppose both the plaintiff and defend-
ant. These rules will probably provide a more definite test of
the interest required to intervene without taking away the trial
judge's right to use his discretion in certain cases.24
The adoption of the federal rule allowing the intervention to
stand even though the main demand has been dismissed will ef-
fect a legislative overruling of cases which the court found it
necessary to distinguish in the instant case. At the same time
it will very appropriately result in the legislative adoption of the
rule'of the instant case without retaining the restriction imposed
by the court.
C. A. King, II
ROYALTY PER SE - WHO BENEFITS UPON ITS
PRESCRIPTION
In 1943, Niblett Farms, owner of a tract of land with the
minerals thereon, conveyed a 1/24th royalty interest to various
persons. In 1948, Niblett Farms sold the land to the defendant
Broussard, retaining a 3/32nd royalty interest which included
the outstanding 1/24th royalty interest, and reserving 1/2 of all
the minerals. The act of sale stipulated that in the event of pro-
duction 2/3 of the total royalty interest was payable out of the
mineral interests held by the vendor and 1/3 out of that held by
intervention, and there need be no independent ground of federal jurisdiction."
Id. paragraph 24.07 at 32. Intervention of right is provided for the case in which
a person will be "adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of prop-
erty in the custody of the court." Id. paragraph 24.08 at 35; paragraph 24.09 at
45. An applicant may be permitted to intervene if his claim has some question
of law or fact in common with the main suit. Id. paragraph 24.10 at 59. The
court exercises its discretion in these cases to determine whether the intervention
will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication. As regards the problem considered
in the instant case, under the federal rules, the intervention does not fall with the
dismissal of the plaintiff's action. Federal Rule 41(a) (2). This source was par-
tially relied on for the rule of the Louisiana Law Institute in the Proposed Louisi-
ana Code of Civil Procedure.
. 22. Proposed Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure art. 1092; LA. CODE OF PRAC-
TICE art. 396 (1870), now LA. R.S. 13:396 (1950).
g3. Proposed Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure art. 1091.
24. Id. art. 1091, comment (a).
